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ABSTRACT
This paper intends to analyse the underpinnings of the 
Grand National Dialogue as a strategic and operational 
framework for the construction of a public problem in 
the crisis between the Cameroonian government and the 
separatist movements of the North West and South West. 
The dynamics and related trajectories within the framework 
of a complex otherness reflect the efforts of the public 
authorities to domesticate violence and establish the 
imperative of a “one and indivisible Cameroon” and of 
living together as structuring frameworks of solutions to 
crises in the country.
The stake of this Grand National Dialogue also refers 
to the logic of de-internationalization of the treatment 
of the crisis; however, this dialogue did not have the 
desired effect. The denial for a long time focused on the 
crisis, combined with the problem of underdevelopment 
accentuated by nepotism, ethnic exclusion, corruption 
and marginalization, the sequence and consequence of 
bad governance, has been used by the separatists as a 
pretext to resort to arms as a means of expressing their 
‘grievances’.
To achieve this, the separatist movements mobilized 
symbolic and emotional elements, in particular the 
decay of basic social structures, the feeling of betrayal, 
marginalization, domination and above all the minority 
reflexes. Preventing violent conflict requires that societies 
be able to address the root and structural causes of 
conflict including poverty, social inequality, patterns of 
discrimination and social exclusion.
The Cameroonian government should consider the path 
of true reconciliation with all Cameroonians, sons and 
daughters of the North West and South West region. This 
presupposes and involves a comprehensive and inclusive 
process, including key instruments such as justice, truth, 
redress, etc. that allow the transition from a divided past 
to a common future.
This reconciliation must be sustainable and should help 
replace “fear” with peaceful coexistence with a view to 
non-violent social transformation. Hence, the new tasks of 
thought: to re-weld the broken social bond and restore 
the lost trust between the stakeholders, the key decision-
makers and the actors, the central protagonists as well as 
all the allies. The main challenge of the dilemma of seeking 
peace in a fiercely divided society is “how to build and 
maintain peace”.
This reflection brings out useful perspectives for building 
peace. It answers the following question: what perspectives 
are useful for building peace in the North West and South 
West? What are the approaches and practical activities 
likely to lead to a non-violent social transformation and 
which have the capacity to make this quest for peace 
continue? Building peace in the Nord West and South West 
also requires, beyond traditional state diplomacy, requires 
a long-term commitment consisting in establishing, 
between the belligerents, a link that mobilizes, from 
within, the resources to work for reconciliation and which 
maximizes contributions from outside. The building of 
peace relies, so to speak, on the various actors and on 
activities aimed at achieving and sustaining reconciliation.
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INTRODUCTION
Peace is not a pre-established harmony that is imposed 
on human societies from the outside. It is eminently social 
and its structuring in society is realistic. In other words, 
there is peace only in relation to a socio-political context, 
and peace within a socio-political community is built 
around certain balances of power. Realistic peace or social 
peace is, so to speak, a political construction, the corollary 
of which is the construction of a democratic state that 
respects human rights. The hypothesis of realistic peace 
is therefore that of peace as a cardinal and omnipotent 
element of social dynamics1, a framework for socio-
political action, a norm of social behaviour, and above all 
as a model for the production of society around a certain 
number of issues and power relations in the context of the 
globalisation of geostrategic and security issues.
Thus, in the theatre of conflict in Cameroon, state power has 
been overwhelmed and surpassed by the great magnitude 
of social impulses that reconstruct the balance of authority 
and command within the state2. In its security dimension, 
the internal and external geopolitics of Cameroon has been 
dominated for over a decade since the year 2000 by the 
coalescence of two complex internal security crises. In the 
Far North region, the jihadist terrorists of Boko Haram are 
sowing terror and desolation among the population. Since 
the end of 2016, armed groups have taken advantage of 
this favourable “window of opportunity” to position their 
separatist and secessionist demands on the country’s 
national and foreign political agenda thanks to the 
corporatist demands of teachers and lawyers in the two 
English-speaking regions of the country, plunging those 
regions into a situation of instability. 
1 For a better understanding of the contemporary politics of the peace/democracy and peace/
development dialectic in the epistemological renewal of post-bipolar international relations, refer 
to the inaugural lesson of the expert in international law and international criminal and human 
rights law, Professor Jean Didier Boukongou for whom the “universal sanctuarisation of peace 
is denied on a daily basis by the ordinary and routine chaos of conflicts which casts doubt on 
the capacity of international law to produce a lasting peace dynamic if the dialectical link with 
development and democracy is not found and maintained permanently” in De la paix au XXIème 
siècle, Yaoundé, UCAC Press, 2007, Page 13.
2 Yves Alexandre CHOUALA, Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. Vol. 8, Special Issue, 2001, P.2.
Meanwhile, the country is experiencing the throes of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. According to statistics published in 
June 2020, since mid-March 2020, almost 218 people have 
died, and 8929 people have tested positive3. These security 
crises with complex stakes, go beyond the simple limits 
of the Cameroonian national territory4. Gérard CHALIAND 
characterises them as “ritualised wars” and “wars without 
neighbourhoods”, these civil wars “are the most irrational 
of all wars, so much so that the costs most of the time 
exceed the very stakes of the conflict”5.
Faced with the recurrence of violence and insecurity in 
the Far North, as well as in the South-West and North-
West of the country, and in pursuit of the goal of finding 
lasting solutions for a return to peace and stability, the 
Cameroonian government has deployed a series of 
political, social, and economic measures,6 with a strong 
psychological impact, in order to restore confidence 
in the perceptions and representations of citizens and 
republicans. The objective being to reduce to its minimum 
the psychological impact of terrorism and proto-terrorism, 
Boko Haram jihadist in the Far North, and secessionist in 
the North-West and South-West regions7.
3 In the north-west where the conflict is raging there are nearly 179 infected cases, with 31 deaths 
and 518 people tested. In the Southwest, there are nearly 16 deaths and 292 confirmed cases and 
715 people tested. See Health Cluster World Health Organization, North-West and South-West, 
Health Cluster Update, 19 May-03 June 2020 -Bulletin # 06 (June 10, 2020), 11/06/2020, 
sur https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-north-west-and-south-west-health-cluster-
update-19-may-03-june-2020-0
4 G. CHALIAND, Anthologie mondiale de la stratégie : des origines au nucléaire, Robert LAFFONT, 
1990, PP. XVIII- XIV.
5 Ibid
6 In these regions, various measures have been taken at the socio-economic level. Inexhaustively, 
these include: - the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2017-2021, and the numerous sectoral 
projects carried out by the various ministries; - the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Plan 
for the North-West and South-West regions created in June 2018 and estimated at 12.7 billion 
FCFA, which is supposed to address the worsening humanitarian situation (160,000 internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in the two regions; In addition, the following actions have been carried 
out : the effective translation of OHADA texts into English; the creation of a Common Law Section 
at the National School of Administration and Magistracy to train English-speaking court auditors 
and registrars; the creation of a Common Law Section at the Supreme Court to hear appeals 
against decisions of lower courts in common law cases; the creation of a Ministry dedicated 
to Decentralisation and Local Development. The special recruitment of Bilingual Teachers in 
Secondary Education; the creation of a National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism 
and Multiculturalism; the halting of the proceedings ordered against certain persons arrested in 
the context of the crisis in the two regions.
7Wullson MVOMO ELA, Contribution des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité dans la résolution des 
crises internes au Cameroun, Honneur et fidélité, December 2019.
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It is with a view to restoring confidence, peace, and 
stability that the Grand National Dialogue held in Yaounde 
from September 30 to October 4, 20198 was convened by 
the Head of State on September 10, 2019. The aim was 
to “examine ways and means of responding to the deep 
aspirations of the people of the North-Western and South-
Western regions, but also all the other regions of the 
country”9. Indeed, “the dialogue in question [concerned] 
mainly the situation in the North-West and South-West 
regions. This dialogue was built around the following 
themes: bilingualism, diversity and social cohesion, the 
education system, the return of refugees and IDPs, the 
reconstruction and development of regions affected by the 
conflict, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of 
ex-combatants, decentralisation and local development, 
the role of the diaspora in the crisis and its participation in 
the development of the country.10 In Cameroon, the current 
theatre of conflict reveals a spiral of political, economic, 
social and identity-related factors that make it difficult to 
achieve the climate of peace that has long characterised 
the country, both in the Far North, but especially in the 
North-West and South-West. Their inclusion on the 
national agenda, by the presidential executive institution, 
is the result of a long-term construction, and because of 
which the said concerns have attracted the attention of the 
public authorities at the highest level.
8 Read Report by the General Rapporteur of the Grand National Dialogue, Yaoundé Conference 
Center, 4/10/ 2019 https://nationaldialogue.cm/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/GDN-
Rapport-rapporteur-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-fr-ok.pdf
9 Message from the Head of State to the Nation, 10 September 2019.
10 Ibid
This article seeks to analyse the Grand National Dialogue 
as a framework for constructing social problem. In the 
sense of complex otherness, the relevant dynamics and 
trajectories take account of the public authorities’ attempts 
to domesticate violence and thus to identify the categorical 
imperatives of one and indivisible Cameroon and to live 
together as structuring mechanisms for resolving the 
ongoing crises in the country.
The organization of the Grand National Dialogue also 
demonstrates, through structured political discourse, the 
rationale of de-internationalisation in coping with the 
crisis. The process of internationalisation was initiated 
not only by some international organizations, but also 
by foreign powers and other actors. While some powers 
have been or remain favourable to Swiss mediation11 
(Canada, Switzerland), others, such as France, Great Britain 
and the United States, have taken a clear and firm stance 
towards the Cameroonian authorities on the crisis. This 
is demonstrated by meetings within the Security Council 
or meetings in the context of the Arria formula12 on the 
crisis in question. These meetings allowed certain powers, 
such as China and Russia, to reiterate their support for 
Cameroon through the development of the principle of 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. To 
this effect, the Representative of the Russian Federation, 
Anatoly Gennadrevitch Bashkin will affirm at the end of his 
audience with the Cameroonian Foreign Minister, Le Jeune 
Mbella, the following:
This is demonstrated by meetings within the Security 
Council or meetings in the context of the Arria formula 
on the crisis in question. These meetings allowed certain 
powers, such as China and Russia, to reiterate their support 
for Cameroon through the development of the principle 
of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. 
The Representative of the Russian Federation, Anatoly 
Gennadrevitch Bashkin to this effect stated at the end 
of his meeting with Le Jeune Mbella, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Cameroon, that,
 
“We are opposed to a humanitarian intervention and once 
again our position is that the Cameroonian President, 
the government and the people can solve the problem 
themselves without international intervention”13. 
11 The Swiss mediation proposed by the Swiss government has so far been approved by the 
separatist movements as a neutral intermediary in the management of the crisis. The Swiss 
mediators are working to prepare the separatists for the techniques of negotiation and the 
drafting of grievances. The Cameroonian authorities did not support this mediation, which once 
again avoided a form of containment and internationalisation of the reconciliation process. Also, 
the deep rapprochement of the Swiss and the secrecy surrounding these negotiations led to its 
depreciation by the public authorities. Read: Le conflit anglophone au Cameroun Un dialogue 
sans partenaires, Cynthia Petrigh IFRI, October 2019, P.28.
12 RFI, Crise au Cameroun anglophone : le point à l’ONU sur les dernières avancées, 13/12/2019 
on http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20191213-crise-cameroun-anglophone-onu-fait-le-point-
dernieres-avancees
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These battles around internationalisation and competition 
around the mediation of the Anglophone crisis were likely 
to reduce the scope of public action to resolve the crisis. 
Managing this internal crisis within the country, indeed 
appeared to be a priority for the Government to reaffirm 
its leadership in the area of qualification. Contrary to what 
separatist expected, the government’s discourse, with 
republican referents, echoed wide. The Grand National 
Dialogue was a hermeneutic to be addressed in this 
discourse, however it was more specifically to consider 
the North-West and South-West security situation (I). In 
so doing, it took account of the divergent dynamics and 
interests between the actors (II) and efforts to find global 
solutions to the current crisis (III).
I -  THE GREAT NATIONAL 
DIALOGUE: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE 
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE NORTH-
WEST AND SOUTH-WEST REGIONS OF 
CAMEROON
The specific trajectory of the crisis in the North-West and 
South-West regions reflects the dynamics of its construction 
as a social problem (B). Within the Cameroonian public 
space, one will notice a mobilisation-competition involving 
both public authorities and other social actors. And their 
multifaceted interpretations will help to make the Grand 
National Dialogue a context for understanding the crisis in 
the North-West and South-West (A).
A. A Republican Framework for Understanding 
the Crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions
A widespread mobilisation of the various social actors was 
observed from the beginning of the return to crisis in the 
North-West and South-West regions. Public authorities, 
civil society, political parties, diplomatic representations 
present in Cameroon, Cameroonians from all walks of life 
have taken up the issue, rightly or wrongly labelling the 
causes of such a violent upsurge in this southern part of 
the country. Some presented the crisis as an attempted 
insurrection against the central government in Yaoundé 
from the North-West and South-West regions. Others 
were quick to raise the hypothesis that the crisis is an 
“English-speaking issue” coming from the hegemonic 
agreements that led to Cameroon reuniting in 1961. This 
labelling of the situation, which is still valid, is likely to 
call into question the deep peaceful social ties that have 
hitherto existed between Cameroonians.
Indeed, the shift in the agenda from the corporatist demands 
of English-speaking teachers and lawyers to secessionist 
tendencies, with the attendant violence and political 
demands linked to federalism, has enabled the crisis to 
move on to a new stage, both in its characterisation and 
in the representations and perceptions it has engendered. 
The political14, economic15, social16, identity17, security and 
humanitarian18 referents were thus widely mobilised to 
14  Political demands have mainly focused on secession and federalism.
15 We are referring here to the geopolitics of natural resources in the North-West and South-
West regions.
16 The blockade and the dead cities imposed by the separatist armed groups affect the daily life 
of the populations, their freedom of movement, and reduce their access to certain basic services 
such as basic health care, water and access to regular markets for food.
17 Cameroon News, National Unity in Cameroon: the tribal curse, 22/05/2020 on https://
actucameroun.com/2020/05/22/unite-nationale-au-cameroun-la-malediction-tribale/ consulted 
on 15/06/2020 at 6pm
18 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) estimates that 
there have been nearly 3,000 deaths since the beginning of the crisis, plus 1.5 million displaced 
persons, including more than 50,000 refugees who have fled to neighbouring regions of Nigeria, 
notably Cross River State and Benue State, UNHCR West and Central Africa, January 2020, https://
reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-west-and-central-africa-update-january2020 consulted on 15 
June 2020 at 6pm.
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address the situation. Thus making it part of the long-
lasting revenge of history19. Indeed, the resurgence of 
the past is increasingly taking place in today’s societies. 
Just as political and strategic use can be made of history, 
there is the imperative need to summon the legacy of 
the past to better avoid certain historical analogies which 
can sometimes be used as mobilising slogans for political 
purposes.
Some observers see in the emergence of this crisis, 
geostrategic and geopolitical motives articulated around 
the exploitation of natural resources present in English-
speaking regions and the destabilization of Cameroon; a 
pivotal state in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. This 
places it at the centre of all attention. This interpretation 
reveals a strategic and private war which exposes the war 
promoters, their modes of action and whose violence 
would constitute one of the surest means of appropriating 
the natural resources contained in the subsoil of the 
North-West and South-West regions. Indeed, according to 
Philipe le Billon, access to income from natural resources 
makes it possible to buy arms and finance the rebellions. 
The rebels or separatist movements could also benefit from 
external financial support by signing future exploitation 
agreements between transnational companies and/or 
the rebels, around its resources (Booty future). Here, the 
intervention of a neighbouring state in an internal conflict 
can most often be explained by the fact of wanting to give 
its support to the rebel movements, with a view to seeing 
the government in power being overthrown.
Faced with these different interpretations of the current 
situation in the North-West and South-West regions, the 
Grand National Dialogue (GND) appeared to be a real 
forum for understanding the crisis. Beyond the refusal 
of some separatist leaders like Ebenezer Akwanga, Cho 
Ayaba, Samuel Ikome Sako, Mark Bareta, the participants 
present at the GND, constituting several members of 
the Cameroonian government, ex-combatants, religious 
leaders, traditional chiefs, representatives of political 
parties, and some actors of the international community, 
met at the Yaoundé Conference Centre in the political 
capital of Cameroon in order to discuss and take a common 
look at the root causes of the crisis, especially the reasons 
that led some Cameroonians taking up arms, and above all, 
to find a favourable outcome to this situation with a view 
to a return to peace and stability in the South-West and 
North-West regions – the main reason for this dialogue. 
This mobilisation-competition of social actors made it 
possible to account for the dynamics and trajectories of 
publicising the English-speaking issues.
19 Burno Tertrais, La revanche de l’histoire, Odile Jacobs, 2017, P.144.
B. The Crisis in the North West and South West 
Regions: Dynamics and Trajectories of Constructing a 
Social Problem
The crisis in the English-speaking regions of the country, 
as well as its management, appears to be long term20. In 
fact, for the historian Fernand Braudel, “history is not only 
a narrative, even of great events, it is an explanation”21. In 
this respect, the civic space, produced in the Cameroonian 
situation by a double process of liberalisation of speech 
and the media22 initiated in the early 1990s, becomes a 
framework for objectifying public action to resolve the 
crisis. Also, the security situation in the North-West and 
South-West will be put on the agenda, understood as “all 
the problems that are dealt with in any form whatsoever 
by the public authorities and therefore likely to be the 
subject of one or more decisions”.23
In the Cameroonian context, the process of selecting 
issues and the way in which some of them may or may not 
attract public attention – “a scarce resource, the allocation 
of which depends on competition within a system of 
public arenas”24 – proves to be relevant. If at the end of 
2016, when the protests were launched in the North-West 
and South-West regions, the Government took a series 
of measures25 to resolve the crisis, the convening of the 
Grand National Dialogue by the Head of State makes 
sense in that it underpins a process of specific publicising 
and setting of an agenda. Understanding the dynamics of 
collective mobilisation, media coverage and politicisation 
allows us to grasp the sometimes subterranean logics that 
have framed its agenda setting through the GND.
20 Fernand Braudel. Comment on récrit l’histoire . Les usages du temps dans les Écrits sur l’histoire 
de Fernand Braudel, Revue d’Histoire du XIXème siècle, P. 57-81,  https://journals.openedition.
org/rh19/419 consulté le15/06/2020 at 6pm
21 Fernand Braudel, Les ambitions de l’histoire, Éditions de Fallois/Livre de poche, 1997, p.37. The 
edition brings together the lectures of the years 1941-1944 and texts already collected in Écrits 
sur l’histoire, 1969.
22 ABE C., « Espace public et recompositions de la pratique politique au Cameroun », Polis/
R.C.S.P. /C.P.S.R.Vol. 13, Numéros 1 - 2, 2006, p. 42-43.
23 Garraud P., 1990, « Politiques nationales : l’élaboration de l’agenda », L’Année sociologique, 
p. 27.
24 Hilgartner S. et Bosk C., 1988, « The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arena Mode l», 
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 94, n° 1, p.55
25 Several sectoral measures have been adopted by the Government to respond to demands 
seen as corporatist from the outset: the creation of English-speaking sections in some higher 
institution of education; the creation of new establishments and departments in the State 
Universities; the special recruitment for scientific subjects of 1000 young bilingual teachers; the 
redeployment of teachers from the two education sub-systems according to their language skills; 
and the creation, on 23 January 2017, of a National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism 
and Multiculturalism; on 20 June 2018, an Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Plan of 12 billion 
FCFA for the victims of this crisis was launched by the government; well before the creation, on 
30 November 2018, of a National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(CNDDR) of ex-combatants from Boko Haram and armed rebel groups. The release of 298 
detainees in December 2018. A five-fold increase in the decentralisation budget for 2019. From an 
operational point of view, a fifth Joint Military Region (RMIA5 ) was created on 21 February 2018 
by the Cameroonian Head of State, by splitting up the former 2nd Joint Military Region (RMIA 
2) which initially covered the Littoral, West and NO-SW regions. With Bamenda as its command 
post and covering the West and North-West, the RMIA5 coordinates its actions with the RMIA2 
dedicated to the South-West regions.
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From a constructivist perspective, the dynamics of the 
North-West and South-West crisis in the Cameroonian 
public space says a lot about the perceptions and induced 
representations of this situation, thereby reinforcing the 
idea that no problem is intrinsically public because of its 
specific properties. Most of the problems are the subject 
of an important work of labelling carried out by collective 
actors or moral entrepreneurs26, as part of a social and 
political process. The situation in the North-West and 
South-West regions, in the first instance, takes on a 
corporatist dimension to address certain shortcomings 
observed in the judicial and education sectors. Next, 
there is a progressive armed and violent protest, against 
a backdrop of separatist and secessionist tendencies. The 
violent and worrying nature of the situation on the ground 
and the socio-economic impact of the crisis have led to 
the deployment of the country’s defensive and security 
measures to restore order, ensure the security of property 
and people, and above all to thwart the initiatives of 
separatist groups.
The complexity of the situation, accentuated by the “fear” 
aroused by the separatist fighters, the repeated and 
repetitive attacks against the population, the defence and 
security forces and the relative effectiveness of the actions 
carried out so far, made it possible to bring the crisis out of 
the banal order, that is to say, “what is expected, because 
it repeats itself without surprise, in everyday deeds and 
gestures”. However, the convening of the GND has basically 
helped to deconstruct the dominant discourse of the 
situation as the affair of Cameroonians only in the North-
West and South-West regions. The social and economic 
impact, which was reflected in the slowdown of economic 
activities, the paralysis of some administrations, the flow 
26  The expression is borrowed from Becker H. (ed.), 1966, Social Problems: A Modern Approach, 
New York, John Wyler, p. 11
of IDPs, especially towards the neighbouring West and 
Coastal regions, the displacement of some Cameroonians 
to neighbouring Nigeria, associated with the dynamics of 
mobilization, mediation, and politicization in particular, 
have contributed to its effective agenda. According to 
Kingdon, the setting of an agenda is a combination 
of three streams. Firstly, the “problem stream” or the 
emergence of a problem that attracts the attention of 
public authorities through indicators (statistics)27 pushing 
for an active engagement of national public opinion, 
precisely the political parties involved. Secondly, the 
“political stream” having led to the establishment of a set of 
available, adoptable and adaptable public policy solutions, 
according to “their technical feasibility, their compatibility 
with dominant values and their capacity to anticipate 
future constraints” and lastly, the “policy stream”. For 
Kingdon, these streams are applicable when “a problem is 
recognised, [to which] a solution is developed and available 
within the public policy community, [to which] a political 
change makes it the right time for a policy change and 
the potential constraints are not too strong”28. However, it 
should be remembered that no single model can describe 
all the factors that set the agenda or the whole process29 
of the situation in Cameroon.
27 This includes data on the infrastructure destroyed, the number of deaths, both among the 
population and the defence and security forces, the economic losses, the impact on other regions 
of the country, on the national economy, and on the normal functioning of institutions in both 
regions.
28  Kingdon J., 1984, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 
p. 174.
29 KnoepfelP, Larrue C., and F. Varone(2001). Mise à l’agenda politique. Analyse et pilotage des 
politiques publiques . Geneva: Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
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II -  THE GREAT NATIONAL DIALOGUE: 
A SYMBOLIC SPACE FOR RESOLVING 
THE CRISIS IN THE NORTH-WEST AND 
SOUTH-WEST REGIONS
Several measures30 have been taken in the context of the 
GND. Among these, decentralised public governance (A) 
has emerged as a relevant political offer in that it responds 
to certain aspirations of the populations of the North-
West AND South-West regions. The same is true of the 
Presidential Reconstruction Plan (B) for the regions in 
question, set up to ensure their rapid reconstruction and 
recovery.
A. Decentralised Public Governance: Political 
Offer and Response to a Social Demand from the 
Populations of the North-West and South-West?
Decentralised public governance as a means of managing 
the city, with the indirect or direct participation of the 
population in their affairs, is strongly rooted in the 
country’s historical trajectory well before its independence. 
Thus, under French or English administration, within the 
framework of authority or trusteeship, the country has 
experimented with local models of administering the 
affairs of the tutelary city.
It seems relevant not to underestimate the influence 
of Indirect Rule on the social representations and 
perceptions of the populations living in these regions. As 
30  Among other things, the release of nearly 333 prisoners incarcerated in connection with the 
electoral crisis and the opponent Maurice Kamto of the Movement for the Revival of Cameroon.
a matter of fact, the British administration, consciously 
or unconsciously, is a significant legacy in all aspects of 
life. The nostalgic dimension of indirect administration, 
structured around Nigerian federalism, which is a vector 
of a certain type of autonomy has gradually been 
instituted as real social capital31 through its specificity in 
the relationships between citizens and administration, 
transmitted and passed down through generations. The 
British and French administrations actually organised all 
the aspects (economic, political, cultural, educational, 
etc.) of the social life of the populations of West and East 
Cameroon, in such a way as to leave a lasting mark on the 
“collective representation”. Capitalism, “the glue that binds 
communities, organisations, businesses and different 
social and ethical groups”, is expressed here through this 
legacy of social structures inherited from British indirect 
rule.
Included on the agenda of the Great National Dialogue 
in the framework of Commission n° 8 dedicated to 
decentralisation and local development, decentralised 
public governance was put forward as a political offer 
aimed at considering the deep aspirations of the 
North-West and South-West population, as well as the 
31 For Bourdieu, it is a question of “all the actual and potential resources linked to the possession 
of a lasting network of more or less institutionalised relations of mutual knowledge and 
recognition”, Bourdieu P., Le capital social. In: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Vol. 31, 
January 1980. Le capital social. pp. 2-3
Plan 1: Setting the agenda for the Anglophone problem according to the Kingdon model
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specificities of the said regions. Hence, annihilates the 
secessionist tendencies resulting from the corporatist 
demands that have taken place. Granting special status 
to the North-West and South-West Regions constitutes in 
this respect a real public policy and, as a response to the 
demand from the populations in the said regions, a major 
element of the Great National Dialogue. This political 
framework is based on the revised Act 96/06 of January 
18, 1996 of the June 2, 1972 Constitution, amended and 
supplemented by Act 2008/001 of April 14, 2008, which 
sets the General Framework for Decentralisation32 in 
Cameroon. By reaffirming the Republic of Cameroon to 
be a “decentralized unitary State,”33 the said law enshrines 
the regions and districts as decentralized territorial 
authorities34. About the special character attributed to some 
regions, it is captured in Article 62(1). In fact, according to 
the said article, “The above general regime shall apply to 
all regions. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of this 
Title, the law may take into account the specific features of 
certain regions in their organisation and operation”.
The Content of the Special Statute
The law creating a special status35 for the North-West and 
South-West regions, sent to parliament on December 
13, 2019 by the Cameroonian Government, offers a 
legal specificity to these two regions and therefore the 
possibility of participating in the development of national 
public policies relating to the administration of justice 
in accordance with the Common Law sub-system, the 
English-speaking education sub-system and the creation 
of regional missions of traditional chieftaincy. Specificity 
should be given to the Regional Assembly and the Regional 
Executive Council in both regions. The Regional Assembly 
is composed of 90 members as in all regions and consists 
of two chambers the “House of Divisional Representatives” 
and the “House of Chiefs”. The aim is to bring the two 
chambers together and allow their members to discuss 
together or separately on the issues submitted to them.
The Law also provides for the appointment of an 
independent mediator under the title “Public Independent 
Conciliator” appointed by presidential decree on the 
joint proposal of the Regional Assembly and the State 
representative of the region concerned. The latter will act 
32 The legal framework of decentralisation in Cameroon is made up of the following texts: Law 
n°2004/017 of July 22, 2004 on the orientation of decentralization; Law n°2004/018 of July 22, 
2004 fixing the rules applicable to communes; Law n°2004/019 of July 22, 2004 fixing the rules 
applicable to regions; Law n°2006/005 of July 14, 2006 fixing the conditions for the election of 
senators; Law n°2006/004 of July 14, 2006 fixing the mode of election of regional councillors; Law 
n°2009/11 of July 10, 2009 on the financial regime of decentralised authorities; Law n°2009/019 
of December 15, 2009 on local taxation; Decree n°2010/1735/PM of June 1, 2010 fixing the 
budgetary nomenclature of decentralised territorial authorities.
33  Article 1 of Law n°96/06 of January 18, 1996 revising the Constitution of June 02, 1972, 
amended and supplemented by Law n°2008/001 of April 14, 2008.
34 Article 55(1) of the Law No. 96/06 of January 18, 1996.
35 This project abolishes, where appropriate, the position of government delegate to urban 
communities.
as a channel of communication between the populations 
of the North-West and South-West regions and the 
administrative authorities36. The Public Independent 
Conciliator in the independent exercise of his functions 
will have to fulfil his responsibilities, particularly those of 
submitting to the competent administrative authorities, the 
grievances of the populations and ensuring the measures 
taken during the Great National Dialogue regarding the 
use of the English language, the implementation of the 
English-speaking education sub-system and the practice 
and respect of Common Law.
Cameroon is a ward of international institutions (League 
of Nations (LON): 1919-1945; United Nations (UN): 
1945-1960). This historical heritage has strongly marked 
the social structures, mentality, representations and 
perceptions of the population in general, which were 
then marked by both direct French administration and 
indirect rule of British inspiration. This second modality of 
administration was particularly implemented in the North-
West and South-West regions of Cameroon.
While ensuring respect for the cultural specificities 
of these regions, the objective of this status is to 
rationalise the principle of inter-communal cooperation 
and strengthen local democracy, while adapting the 
territorial organisation to the challenges and constraints 
of the globalisation-mundialisation of cities and the 
multiple social transformations. The relationship 
between decentralised authorities and administrative 
authorities needs to be clarified. By putting people back 
at the core of local democracy, their role in managing 
the resources of the regions or municipalities would 
help to revitalise local governance. This would first 
require a real professionalisation of the staff working 
within decentralised local authorities. The creation of the 
National School of Local Administration on March 2, 2020 
in Buea, dedicated to the training of staff of decentralised 
local authorities or to the strengthening of their capacities, 
is part of this effort for responsible public governance, 
backed up by the requirements of performance and 
results-based management to better address the needs of 
the populations at the municipal and regional level.
In this regard, putting national interests in line with 
regional and municipal needs would be necessary. The 
bodies of the decentralised local authorities should 
reflect the sociological components and anthropological 
36  Investing in Cameroon; The content of the special status granted to the English-speaking 
regions of Cameroon subject to the  validation of the Parliament ,  
13/12/2019 consulted 27/05/2020 on https://www.investiraucameroun.com/gestion-
publique/1312-13756-le-contenu-du-statut-special-accorde-aux-regions-anglophones-du-
cameroun-soumis-a-la-validation-du-parlement 
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realities of the region and the municipality. In the sense 
of the British indirect administration, a greater role for the 
Native Authorities in regional and local bodies, with direct 
consultation missions similar to their role in the past, will 
make it possible to identify them as true defenders of the 
people and transmit their desires from the grassroots to 
the region.
B. Presidential Plan for the Reconstruction and 
Development of the North-West and South-West 
Regions
Beyond the special status, the Head of State has launched 
a reconstruction plan with a budget of 8.9 billion CFAF, 
with a view to pursuing the implementation of key 
recommendations of the Grand National Dialogue. 
This Presidential Plan for Reconstruction piloted by the 
Minister of Economy, Planning and Land Management 
(MINEPAT), Alamine Ousmane Mey with the technical 
support of the Resident Representative of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Cameroon, 
Jean Luc Stalon,37 whose budget represents 10% of overall 
expenditure, will be used to restore social cohesion, rebuild, 
and rehabilitate basic infrastructure and rejuvenate the 
local economy.
According to the National Coordinator of the said Plan, 
Paul Tasong,38 the first axes of the Plan concern, “the 
intense sensitization of the beneficiaries of the plan, 
the rehabilitation of schools, health centres, roads, the 
reconstruction of bridges, the rehabilitation of water points 
and the re-establishment of electricity lines that have 
been destroyed. This plan also envisages the promotion 
of intensive agriculture through the distribution of 
agricultural inputs as well as the reconstruction of certain 
markets”.39 The financial cap for this first axis is set at 36 
billion CFA francs.
37  On May 5, 2020, the Minister of Economy, Planning and Land Management (Minepat), and the 
Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme, signed a partnership 
agreement which set the course for the activities of this reconstruction plan and the adequate 
financing estimated at CFAF 8.9 billion. Read Minepat, Reconstruction of the NORTHWEST AND 
SOUTHWEST: the government is mobilising 8.9 billion for the launch of the Presidential Plan: 
The State is mobilising 8.9 billion CFA Francs for the reconstruction of English-speaking areas; 
6/05/2020 https://www.minepat.gov.cm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=584:
reconstruction-du-Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest-le-gouvernement-mobilise-8-9-milliards-pour-
le-lancement-du-planpresidentiel&catid=24&lang=fr&Itemid=144consulté le 27/05/2020 à 10h.
38 Deputy Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (Minepat) since March 2, 
2018, aged 57. Born in M’mockmbie in the department of Lébialem, in South West Cameroon. 
He had previously held the posts of Commissioner in charge of the department of economic, 
monetary and financial policies at the ECCAS Commission (2012-2017); Secretary General of 
Minepat (2010-2012) and Director of Public Investment Programming at the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (2004-2010).
39 Interview with the Coordinator on May 15, 2020..
Several actors acknowledge that these responses would 
not be adequate to meet the demands of the English-
speaking part, be it the reconstruction plan or the special 
status given to the North-West and South-West regions, 
as some issues, such as those t of federalism, were ignored 
from the outset40. The dynamics of the crisis in the North-
West and South-West regions as a public problem reflect 
the order of discourse and the modalities of action of 
the various public actors and armed separatist groups 
to promote their respective visions of Cameroon, whose 
conflicting interests remain real catalysts for the recurrence 
of the crisis and thus armed violence.
 
III - CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AND 
COMPETITION BETWEEN THE ACTORS: 
DIALOGUE AND LIVING TOGETHER 
VERSUS PARTITION AND CREATION 
OF AN AMBAZONIA STATE
Emerging from a crisis is a particularly laborious task. While 
it is easier to see violence or a crisis erupt, it remains difficult 
to stop the escalation of violence or even find a lasting 
consensus between the conflicting parties. For Philippe 
Braud, crises arise from the “dilution or disappearance of 
moral or legal points of reference, legal procedures that 
used to regulate exchanges in detail, in order to better 
enshrine their stability, are no longer observed; everyone 
is unaware of the distribution of competences between the 
various institutions. Today we no longer respect what we 
used to revere, iconoclasm attacks what was considered 
sacred until now”41. 
Identity crisis, a legitimacy crisis, a participation crisis, a 
distribution crisis and a penetration crisis. These crises 
can be seen from the perspectives of the compatibility 
or conflict of interests, which can take the form of an 
identity crisis,42 a legitimacy crisis43, a participation crisis44, 
a distribution crisis45 and a penetration crisis46. The 
incompatibility of interests can be due to human nature, 
40 Les Yeux du Monde: Crisis in English-speaking Cameroon: the failure of the Great National 
Dialogue, 9/11/2019, https://les-yeux-du-monde.fr/actualite/actualite-analysee/41928-crise-
cameroun-anglophone-echec-grand-dialogue-national consulted on 27/05/2020 at 10am
41 Braud, Philippe, Sociologie politique, 11th Edition, Paris, LGDJ, 2014, p. 18
42 Disagreement between elites and counter-elites on the establishment of a common system 
of values and symbols, and conflicts around schooling institutions (religions, school, media, etc.).
43 Disagreements between elites and counter-elites about the founding principles of the political 
system that could mobilise a common allegiance to the political system or the state.
44 Conflict over the extent to which the state apparatus can impose the equalisation of socio-
economic conditions between segments of the population and/or regional or local entities.
45 Disagreement between elites and counter-elites over the granting of political and social rights 
to the entire population (including the right to vote).
46 Conflict over the extent to which the state apparatus can set up an administrative mesh of 
territory whose agents only obey centrally
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which imposes itself on us as a need that, according to 
Galtung, “is not chosen, but imposed on us”47. This issue of 
compatibility or incompatibility conditions the possibility 
or impossibility of the dialogue. The quality of a dialogue 
lies in the willingness of the parties concerned to come 
together within a framework to understand the needs 
and expectations of all and to develop new solutions that 
help to satisfy them. This is what Juanita Brown describes 
as “conversations that matter”48. Thus, the government 
would set the universal standard of a “one and indivisible 
Cameroon”49 and of living together, as a coordinated 
system of action (A) in the face of secessionist tendencies 
(B).
A. The “A one and indivisible Cameroon” 
Benchmark and of Living - Together: Trajectories of a 
Normative and Cognitive Framework for Public Action
“The future of our compatriots in the North-West and 
South-West lies within our Republic”.50 Evidently, the 
structuring model of a one and indivisible Cameroon, 
for the Head of State, Paul Biya, and his Government, is 
at the centre of public action both in its representation 
of the situation and in the solutions mapped up. In fact, 
any process of developing public policy requires the 
construction of a representation, an image of the reality 
on which one wants to intervene. It is with reference 
to this cognitive image that the actors organise their 
perception of the problem, confront their solutions and 
47 Galtung, Transcendence and Conflict Transformation, Op.cit. P.15.
48 Reflections on The World Café, Shaping Our Futures Through Conversations That Matter, 
Juanita Brown The  World Café Community, inBerrett-Koehler, SanFrancisco,  http://www.
theworldcafe.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/sofdownload1.pdf.
49 This republican posture is also supported by the Cameroonian parliamentary institution known 
for its notorious silence “authoritarian routines” on all issues that would tend to challenge the 
monopoly of the government. On October 1, 2016, a parliamentary meeting was organized in 
support of peace and indivisibility in Cameroon. The objective, to strengthen offensive regional 
nationalism against the voiceless state read ; Yvan ISSEKIN, Localiser le refus de la sécession 
à Yaoundé : jeux et enjeux du meeting parlementaire de soutien pour la paix et l’indivisibilité 
du Cameroun du 1er octobre 2017, L’Espace politique, Numéro 35, 2017, https://journals.
openedition.org/espacepolitique/5275#authors
50 Message from the Head of State to the Nation - 10 Sept 2019  https://www.prc.cm/fr/actualites/
discours/3776-message-du-chef-de-l-etat-a-la-nation-10-sept-2019,  consulté le 22/05/2020
define their proposals for action: this vision of the world 
is the standard for a policy51. This global framework has 
structured all the actions carried out by the State since the 
crisis in the North-West and South-West regions, as well 
as the dynamics inherent in the Great National Dialogue, 
the main catalyst for State action in this context.
The proclamation of the “Ambazonia State”52 on October 
1, 2017, engaged the Government in a kind of symbolic 
competition to “survive” in the public space and convince 
some irredentists to the vision of “a one and indivisible” 
Cameroon. It is driven by an “advocacy coalition”, i.e. 
a set of actors of a public policy as they share a certain 
number of beliefs constituting a vision of the world 
organised at three levels: a central core or “deep core” 
made up of general beliefs not linked to a specific policy 
(the virtues of Unity, of Peace), beliefs linked to a specific 
policy “policy core” and secondary aspects corresponding 
to more technical issues53 such as the acceleration of the 
decentralisation process and local development, taking 
into account the socio-cultural and linguistic specificities 
of regions in crisis. This “advocacy coalition” could be 
assimilated to the “hegemonic bloc”, as conceptualised by 
Gramsci and taken up by Jean François Bayart, structured 
around the constraints inherent to political continuity, the 
preservation of territorial integrity and the guarantee of 
security for each and everyone.
 
Having the GND at the highest level and its inclusion in the 
national political agenda, thereby reflecting presidential 
pre-eminence, made it possible to recognize that the 
situation now calls for a public, republican debate. Efforts 
to involve ALL Cameroonians, through consultations 
prior to the major dialogue of actors from different 
political parties, lawyers, teachers, civil society actors, 
religious authorities, trade union leaders and students, 
Cameroonians, diplomatic representations in Cameroon, 
did not elicit the support of the main figures of the armed 
protest. The situation, despite the problematisation of 
the main demands within the framework of this great 
republican dialogue, allows two main tendencies to be 
identified.
On the one hand, there is a real difficulty in convincing the 
leaders of the separatist groups on the table of an inclusive 
dialogue wanted by all. This reflects the inoperative nature 
51 Muller P., Les politiques publiques, Que Sais-je, Second Edition, PUF, 18/04/2018.
52 Cameroonweb: Independence of Ambazonie: Ayuk Tabe’s full speech in 2017, September 30, 
2018, on https://www.camerounweb.com/CameroonHomePage/NewsArchive/Ind-pendance-de-
l-Ambazonie-l-int-gral-discours-de-Ayuk-Tabe-en-2017-Retro-447682, consulté le 26/01/2018 à 
8h.
53 Cf. P. A. Sabatier, E. Schlager, “Les approches cognitives des politiques publiques: perspectives 
américaines”, Revue française de science politique, April 2000, vol. 50, no. 22.
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of the confidence-building measures implemented to 
date, which do not seem to be gaining any real traction. 
Confidence is a “firm belief in the competence of an 
entity to act reliably within a specific context”.54 It meets 
the conditions of sincerity of actions taken and the 
dissemination of relevant information55. 
On the other hand, the situation reflects the complexity 
of the security environment in a war against an enemy 
from the inside, which would be further complicated by 
knowledge about the “enemy” inside, in the heuristic 
understanding of the dynamics that structure their real 
motivations, their organisational structure of power and 
power relations both within and outside these groups.
In this context of “re-problematisation” in which the exercise 
of public power is put to the test of inclusive dialogue, the 
construction of confidence-building measures towards 
separatist groups, but above all of appeasement and 
security in crisis regions with a view to a lasting return 
to peace, an indispensable condition for the recovery of 
these regions. This situation also provides a framework 
for analysing the balance of power56 which would reflect 
the political, security and social complexity of the local 
area, through a general imbalance of the territory;57 this 
peripheral analysis would tend to play down the power of 
the Leading Office in Yaoundé58.
54 T. Grandisson, M. Sloman, “A survey of trust in internet applications. Communications Surveys 
& Tutorials”, IEEE, vol. 3, no 4, 2000, PP. 2-16.
55 E.Lorini, R.Demolombe, “From binary trust to graded rust in information sources: A logical 
perspective”, LNAI 5396, 2008, pp.205-225.
56 Foucault Michel, 2013, La société punitive : cours au Collège de France, 1972-1973, Paris, 
France, EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil
57 Fred Eboko and Patrick Awondo, L’État stationnaire, entre chaos et renaissance, Politique 
africaine 2018/2 (n° 150), pages 5 to 27 consulted on 28/05/2020 at 12am, on  https://www.cairn.
info/revue-politique-afric aine-2018-2-page-5.htm
58 Sindjoun Luc, L’État ailleurs. Entre noyau dur et case vide, Paris, Economica, 2002.
The Dialogue, against the backdrop of internal crises,  also 
revolves around the technologies of local government 
through fear and “anxiety”, which have taken into account 
the aspirations of the populations in the North-West and 
South-West regions. The implementation of a special 
status in these two regions, which will have to consider 
the cultural and linguistic specificities inherited from the 
context of international trusteeship and particularly, from 
the British administration of these two regions.
B. Secessionist Violence: Between Armed 
Violence, Symbolic Violence, and Political Demands
Separatist movements (Red Dragons, Tigers and 
Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) and militias, self-defence 
groups) have, since the recurrence of the crisis, not 
stopped claiming the “partition”, “secession” of Cameroon 
and therefore the “creation of the Ambazonia State”. This 
paradigm has structured their main demands which have 
been translated on the ground by armed violence. This 
process of ideological construction can be defined as a 
collectively shared set of images, ideals, and aspirations. It 
provides members with a coherent orientation and gives 
them an image of themselves as a group in which they 
recognise themselves, hence reinforcing the identity of the 
community. To the discourse of secession supported by the 
armed groups, the State has opposed the notion of “one 
and indivisible Cameroon”, framed by the supreme legal 
norm; the Constitution which, in its article 1 paragraph 
2 stipulates that “the Republic of Cameroon shall be a 
(...) unitary State. It shall be one and indivisible”. Article 
64 of the same law prohibits any constitutional revision 
procedure that would undermine the unity and territorial 
integrity of the country59.
59 Such a constitutional text has also found a favourable echo in the weaving of bonds of living 
together socially between Cameroonians of the Anglophone and Francophone parts united by 
social ties (marriages, cultural and religious encounters) which have consolidated the ideology of 
a united nation beyond the unequal sharing that took place during the 1961 plebiscites.
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Table 1: Different political and armed groups involved in the situation in the North-West and South-West
Major 
factions
Acronym Meaning Leaders Political 
Affiliation
Main Objective








(IG) most strategic 
brand
Immediate independence 




Ensure a dominating 
role in the political and 
economic future;






A m b a z o n i a 
Gorvening council 
(AGC) Ex IG
SOCADEF Southern Cameroon 
defense forces
E b e n e z e r 
Akwango
African people 
l i b e r a t i o n 
Movement APLM Ex 
IG









MORIS Movement for the 
restauration of 
independent south
Bo Hebert MORIS Create insecurity and 
instability in specific 
areas to ensure access to 
economic ResourcesSCNC Southern Cameroon 
National Council




O t h e r s 
independetists 
(Corporatists)
CACSC C a m e r o o n 
Anglophone Civil 
Society Consortium 
(CACSC, known as 
“the Consortium”).
Agbo Balla, 
S e s s e m e , 
Wilfred Tassanf...
CACSC Federalism
Faced with this governmental posture, the separatist 
groups adopted a radical stance and deployed a series 
of actions aimed at convincing the populations of the 
North-West and South-West to adhere to their idea 
of a partitioning the North-West and the South-West 
regions60 from the united Cameroon. The propensity to 
radicalism, Veldhuis and Staun61 point out, is rooted in 
the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms or political 
oppression. This denial of rights and freedoms is a catalyst 
for political radicalisation which can take the form of 
terrorist activities. This denial, combined with the problem 
of underdevelopment accentuated by nepotism, ethnic 
exclusion, corruption, and marginalisation, are recurrent in 
the Cameroonian socio-political domain62. The economic, 
political, and social marginalisation resulting from poor 
governance has been used by separatists as justification 
for using arms as a means of expressing their ‘grievances’. 
In order to accomplish this, the separatist movements have 
mobilised and presented to the populations of the North-
West and South-West, symbolic elements, social structures, 
60 Today in Ambazonia  we celebrated our national Independence Day. 1st of October 1961. God. 
A video circulating on social networks shows the participation of young people from the North-
West and South-West and some traditional authorities taking part in the parade organised by 
the separatist movements on October 1, 2019, we can see a real motivation of these populations 
ns to the initiative.
61 Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J. , Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model, The Hague, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations Clingendael. 2004.
62 Jean-Franyois Bayart: L’Etat au Cameroun Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences 
Politiques, 1979.
common interests, constructed and nurtured by a triple 
feeling of betrayal, marginalisation and domination; the 
basis of which is the myth of the minority63.
The argument of the marginalised minority had already 
been expressed in the past in the 1990 Buea Declaration 
as follows: 
“Our problem... is that Francophone leaders have betrayed 
our trust and there is no transparency in public affairs. 
Our Union Agreement During these thirty-two years 
has been breached. We have been deprived of electoral 
rights, marginalized, treated with suspicion; our interests 
have been disregarded; our participation in the life of the 
nation has been confined to non-essential functions...we 
have gone from being equal partners to being a people 
under yoke”.64 
This triptych of a marginalised, betrayed and dominated 
minority realised around symbolic mobilisations,65 
speeches, propagandas, through effective mediatisation 
(the presence of the media: radio, television, playstore-
63 Ibid
64 Statement by the English-speaking Congress at its meeting 1 Buea, 2nd – 3rd April 1993 http://
www.politiqueaine.com/numes/pdf/051139.pdf
65 Ibid
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mobile application), publicity, even internationalisation 
(hosting of the All Ambazonia Conference in Washington) 
and a politicisation. The desire to create an Ambazonian 
entity with state referents has also resulted in the 
implementation of important symbols (flag, “defence 
funding statehood, diplomacy” emblem, the “proclamation 
of the State of Ambazonia”66 and appeals for funding and 
schemes (by way of the Ambacoin crow sales community), 
with a view to organising actions deemed “just” and 
“liberating” . In addition, lobbying activities have been 
carried out by emblematic actors of the diaspora.
These symbolic mobilisations have encouraged the 
conscious or unconscious support of a large section of 
the population. The armed groups, following the historical 
trajectory of the construction of political and state order in 
Cameroon, have reproduced certain authoritarian modes 
of governance ‘by fear’ through acts of unprecedented 
violence, kidnappings, threats against populations 
defying the ‘ghost towns’, or the banning of pupils and 
students from going to school or university. The social 
psychosis has been further accentuated by the capacity of 
separatist armed groups to test the defence and security 
apparatus of the state through targeted attacks, but also 
the destruction of public buildings, hostage-taking for 
ransom, kidnapping of humanitarian personnel, looting, 
extortion and torture. 
66 Europe 1: Ambazonia declares its independence, 03/11/2017 on https://www.europe1.fr/
emissions/le-journal-du-monde/lambazonie-declare-son-independance-3453740 consulted on 
07/06/2020, at 11am
Also, the atrocious murders of certain elements of the 
defence and security forces or public administration officials, 
through their symbolic charge and the psychological 
impact of distrust of the state, were committed with a 
view to dissuading anyone who dared to go against the 
separatist vision conveyed by the armed groups. Since the 
beginning of the crisis in 201667 more than 3,000 civilians 
and hundreds of security force personnel have been killed 
in the English-speaking regions, with some over 1.5 million 
refugees.68
Since the arrival of armed groups, there has been a 
symbolic competition within the public space between 
a governmental discourse centred around the “one and 
indivisible Cameroon” notion and a discourse convened 
by the armed insurgent and separatist groups. The 
propensity of these groups to win the hearts and minds of 
the greatest number is not to be taken lightly.
67 TV5 monde: Exclusive document: Le pouls de l’Ambazonie, région anglophone du Cameroun 
en crise, 12/06/2018,, https://www.hrw.org/fr/world-report/2020/country-chapters/336595 
consulté le 10/06/2020
68 Human Rights Watch Report, Cameroon 2019 Events, https://www.hrw.org/fr/world-
report/2020/country-chapters/336595 accessed 10/06/2020
The data created by (ACLED) Figure 1 attributes most 
incidents and attacks to separatist movements
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As a matter of fact, one of their members in an interview 
with France24 stated, “this is the flag of the former English-
speaking territory in Cameroon, I respect it very much and 
I have it in every corner of my house... it is the symbol 
of a new country, Ambazonia. It is the flag that makes us 
so patriotic. We must have our own army which should 
take care of all our affairs...we still have the Republic of 
Cameroon on our territory, we must imagine all the 
possibilities to chase them away from our territory, so that 
we can manage our economy, run our administrations, 
and take care of our own affairs”69.
Moreover, the armed groups in their quest to communicate 
their separatist vision to the population have their claims 
centred around the accentuation of social inequality 
and mistrust of government institutions, which have 
become incapable of ensuring the minimum needs of the 
population in terms of security, representation (democracy, 
respect for rights and freedoms, etc.)70 and social comfort 
(food, health, and education needs). In the event of non-
compliance, attacks are now carried out against the 
population, spawning panic within the communities that 
have become the main hostages. The reflection of this 
new warlike confrontation has led to the disassociation 
of many supporters and lobbyists who feel that they “no 
longer identify with the fight led by the separatists, who 
have become predators for their own families”71.
69  France 24: Cameroun: l’Ambazonie, la République fantasmée des séparatistes anglophones, 
16/10/2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjw2J9X_Jd8 consulté le 07/06/2020, at 8 pm
70 Several actors agree that the crisis could have been avoided from the outset if the government 
had listened and taken concrete measures to address the trade unionist social demands made 
by teachers, followed by lawyers and young students. Its brutal methods in response to these 
non-violent actions led to the situation being inflamed. Read: Les Racines historiques de la crise 
anglophone, Edilivres, Sintiche Nahomie Pagnou Tchinda, 27/02/2020.
71 Online interview with someone close to the separatist elements in the field, Montreal May 
10, 2020, 8pm.
For some, the use of force by the state and the separatist 
movements justifies the accentuated radicalism of the 
separatist groups and the criticism of the Great National 
Dialogue. Human Right Watch asserts that the use of 
violence by the government and separatist groups has 
resulted in mass deaths on both sides and a decline in 
human rights and universal freedoms72. The recurrence 
of the threats and violence carried out by the separatists, 
their exclusion from the Grand Dialogue and the rejection 
of the proposals presented at this event are proof that the 
dialogue conducted has not had the desired impact.
The vision of the armed groups seems to be permanent 
despite the GND materialising. As far as their leaders are 
concerned, the granting of a special status to these two 
regions does not seem to meet the expectations of the 
separatist movements, who demand a de facto partition. 
As such, the special status according to Ebenezer Akwanga, 
leader of one of the separatist groups, would serve no 
purpose stating, “we are not part of Cameroon, Ambazonia 
is marching towards freedom and nothing can stop us”73.
Similarly, some analysts believe that the issue of federalism 
was totally ignored during the dialogue. Like Edith Kah 
Wallah, leader of the Cameroon People’s Party, they see 
in it the government’s willingness to remain silent on 
the subject, which remains the crux of the crisis, because 
“the content of the dialogue was not negotiated. It was 
imposed by the regime”74 It appears that the symbolic 
competition and violence to win the hearts and minds of 
the greatest number of people remains topical and that 
the obsession of the public authorities to ensure that the 
vision of “one and indivisible Cameroon”, the basis for 
living together, still structures collective representations 
and perceptions. Also, the separatist option anchored on 
certain frustrations, social inequalities, etc. is not a relevant 
alternative.
72 Human Rights watch, Op.cit.
73 Ibid
74 Africanews: Cameroun: les recommandations du Grand dialogue rejetées par les chefs 
séparatistes, 04/10/2019, accessed 27/05/2020 on https://fr.africanews.com/2019/10/04/
cameroun-les-recommandations-du-grand-dialogue-rejetees-p
Figure 2, illustrates the magnitude of deaths associated 
with separatist groups
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CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, the September-October 2019 dialogue 
due to its structure, timing and also the established absence 
of some protagonists, did not seem to have the achieved 
the desired impact. In order for a dialogue process to be 
effective, it is important that external and non-external 
support be able to respond concretely and sustainably 
to the concerns of the population. The arguments for 
marginalisation should therefore not be underestimated. 
The prevention of violent conflict requires that societies 
be able to address the root causes of conflict such as 
poverty, inequality and patterns of discrimination or social 
exclusion. Far from justifying the violence perpetrated 
by separatist movements, it would be important for 
governments to consider forms of response other than 
violent or armed modes of action, which tend to call into 
question their willingness to genuinely end the crisis. The 
denial of economic, political, and social marginalization 
should be abandoned by the Government and a genuine 
inclusive dialogue considered.
The word dialogue comes from the Greek derivative 
dialogos; (dia) the word and (logos) literally. It can 
therefore describe any communication that uses words to 
convey meaning. However, the term has come to refer to a 
specific form of participatory process – as used in the public 
sphere during the post-Cold War era – which is especially 
well suited to meet social needs75. A genuine dialogue 
for practitioners is one that “promotes improvement, 
understanding and interaction between people who are in 
conflict or who have a different approach to a problem”. 
Dialogue is not aimed at finding immediate solutions, but 
at generating positive results through communicating and 
listening to each other. Here, it is necessary to be able to 
recognise that the parties in conflict may have different 
perceptions and to commit to finding an outcome that is 
favourable to all. A well conducted dialogue, according 
to human rights and humanitarian practitioners, leads to 
better negotiation and a peaceful political process.
According to Women Informal Globalizing and Mobilizing 
(WIEGO), dialogue is not a mass meeting, an event 
controlled by a single interest group, an event that straddles 
formalities and protocols, a seminar or conference, a 
forum for communicating research results to the public, 
an opportunity to present pre-prepared resolutions 
or an ultimatum, a meeting organised on the spur of 
the moment76. Within the context of the Great National 
Dialogue, the aforementioned elements of the structure 
and timeframe, the ability to domesticate, and above all 
the international pressure on crisis management, etc., had 
a considerable impact on the outcome of this Dialogue, 
making it not only difficult for ALL actors to participate, 
but also to discuss in an objective manner.
True dialogue takes place when the parties in conflict 
articulate and recognise common goals and concerns, i.e.:
 
• Recognise different perspectives; 
• Recognise unequal power relations; 
• Understand that each interest group can expect to 
lose ground and gain ground77. 
A well-structured dialogue can be a powerful platform 
for advocating for a return to peace. The government of 
Cameroon should consider the path of true reconciliation 
with the sons and daughters of the North-West and South-
West regions beyond dialogue. This requires:
• A comprehensive and inclusive process, including key 
instruments such as justice, truth, reparation, etc. that 
enable the transition from a divided past to a common 
future  . This reconciliation is long term and should 
help to replace the ‘fear’ with ‘non-violent coexistence’. 
75 Bettye Pruitt and Philip Thomas, Democratic Dialogue - A Handbook for Practitioners, P.19.
76 Women informal globalizing and mobilizing (WIEGO) Conducting a policy dialogue that 
delivers results, July 2013, P.1.
77 Ibid
Photo from bbc.com
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• Establish the lost trust between the administrative 
authorities and the population.
• Work to develop empathy through recognition of 
the suffering caused by the aggressors precisely 
(separatists, armed forces), as well as populations of 
other regions in the country. 
• Upholding truth as a precondition for reconciliation, 
creating the objective circumstances for people to see 
the past in terms of shared suffering and collective 
responsibility  .
• This process must take place in a climate of peace 
leading to the protection of rights and the political 
commitment of all actors. 
• Reconciliation must be driven within and by the 
whole of society. This requires the participation of 
all the actors in the crisis, each of whom has their 
own traditional or modern experience of conflict 
transformation and resolution. This approach makes 
it possible to break with the effects that a centralised 
dialogue guaranteed by the current power structure 
could have. No least of all, it is also an opportunity 
for all social actors to work together in a constructive, 
inter-relational manner to find a lasting and concrete 
solution capable of reinforcing and consolidating 
the sense of nationality and the State’s sovereignty. 
More than a year after the convocation by the Head 
of State on 10 September 2019, we have considered 
it valid to challenge the Grand National Dialogue as a 
mechanism of domestication, de-internationalization 
of the crisis, political communication and a catalyst 
for values shared by the government and groups with 
separatist ambitions.
As regards the mobilisation and steps adopted to this 
effect, it was noted that the Dialogue in its role as a 
framework for understanding the situation in the North-
West and South-West regions, with a view to better 
understanding it, made it possible over a few days to bring 
into coherence the ambiguous interpretation of the crisis 
in a Cameroonian public space that is constantly changing. 
This symbolic and public forum was, therefore, a real 
opportunity to find ways for a permanent return to peace 
and security – the foundations of stability and prosperity 
in Cameroon – in the attempt to address the security crisis 
in the North-West and South-West.
In this way, across a space-time continuum, the relevance 
of GND from a public policy point of view is expressed 
through the dynamics of problem construction within 
the public space, of competition and complementarity 
of the actors in order to make their values flourish on 
the form of the State, the model of governance. It is 
around the republican values of “one and indivisible 
Cameroon” and “Living Together”, that the governmental 
discourse will be constructed and the actions of the State 
deployed (decentralised public governance, Disarmament 
Demobilisation Reintegration, Presidential Reconstruction 
Plan, etc.), with a view to resolving the crisis in a sustainable 
manner. With respect to armed groups, the secessionist 
claim linked to unprecedented violence on the ground has 
made it possible to convince a few, either through fear or 
conviction.
Moreover, the process of setting the agenda for the 
North-West and South-West illustrates the diverse 
and multifaceted involvement of certain citizens in the 
management of public affairs. This mutual contribution of 
actors to the state issue is embodied in symbolic violence 
by both the public authorities and the separatist armed 
groups, whose psychologically highly charged strategies 
and methods of action are likely to win hearts and minds.
The political, economic, social, and even psychological 
stakes of the Anglophone crisis remain topical. With regard 
to the unique historical trajectory of the North-West and 
South-West regions, the absolute imperative lies in the 
preservation of peace and security, specifically through 
a greater consideration of their socio-cultural heritage 
through effective decentralised public governance on 
one hand. And on the other hand, the reaffirmation of 
the “bilingual” and “bicultural” character of the country, 
which is the foundation of social and national cohesion 
and coexistence in Cameroon.
The differences between the separatists and the 
Government of the Republic of Cameroon could not be 
based on “a territory established by foreign powers in the 
absence of both parties” or on “a territory that was divided 
into two zones of unequal size, always by virtue of treaties 
between foreign powers to which we were not parties”78. 
Security situations led by the entrepreneurs of violence 
and insecurity (separatist groups) in the North-West and 
South-West regions since 2016 have led to a “State crisis”, 
specifically in the State’ s capacity to ensure the security 
of goods and people. Moreover, it has contributed to a 
depreciation of the authority of the state in its regions and 
a weakening of its strategic and organizational capacities. 
78 See Rapport Grand Dialogue, Op.cit; P. 4.
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The reference to the “one and indivisible” sovereignty 
of Cameroon, which alone retains “the monopoly of 
legitimate violence” in its territory, illustrates the need 
for the state to reclaim control of its entire territory and 
secure areas under the control of separatist movements. 
Security, from a realistic point of view, can be understood 
as a “concept of interest defined in terms of power”79. In 
this perspective, state security is part of a philosophical 
production and simultaneously includes a ‘normative 
element’ and a ‘theoretical element’ in terms of “political 
realism”80 according to a naturalistic and realistic vision 
of authors such as Thomas Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hans 
Morgenthau, etc.
These authors ultimately recall that the state, alone in its 
organisational vision of its territory, with the exclusive 
jurisdiction over human and material competencies, holds 
the monopoly of legitimate security services81 capable of 
ensuring or restoring peace. This would mean that security 
comes from the field of sovereignty – from the state’s 
supreme authority – rather than from the efficacy of the 
State’s mechanisms in legitimizing and controlling the 
practice of organized violence82.
Hence, the need for a historic and reminiscence duty. The 
crisis will continue in the North-West and South-West or 
elsewhere for as long as Cameroon and Cameroonians 
reject their common history. The path to reconciliation and 
a return to peace requires the development of a spirit of 
79 Hans J .Morgentahau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Vol. 64, No. 
2 (Jun., 1949), pp. 290-292.
80 Ibid. 
81 Yves-Alexandre CHOUALA, conjoncture sécuritaire, champ étatique et ordre politique au 
Cameroun: éléments d’analyse anthropo-politiste d’une crise de l’encadrement sécuritaire et d’un 
encadrement sécuritaire de crise, Polis / R.C.S.P. / C.P.S.R. Vol. 8, Special Edition, 2001, P2.
82 Ibid. 
compromise and the need to set up a pragmatic approach 
that favours the adoption of concrete and realistic solutions 
that should lead to inclusive community development. In 
this, peace and security are seen as a common and national 
public good. Indeed, there is no development without 
security and no security without development.
In the end, this study should be a pretext to finding 
out how to compare the pros and cons of reactive and 
proactive conflict prevention, which is a prerequisite for 
the establishment of a Conflict Impact Assessment System 
(CIAS) in Africa and its complementary tool, the Conflict 
Assessment Tool (CAST). This system has three objectives:
Firstly, enable decision-makers to anticipate both the 
positive and negative effects of their option or projects on 
conflict dynamics. Secondly, contribute to the development 
of a more coherent peace-building agenda, and finally, 
make policies for sustainable conflict management more 
“cost-effective”.
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